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TIME, POSSESSION, AND ALIENATION
MARGARET JANE RADIN*
I. TIME AND PROPERTY THEORY
"All human interactions," Epstein begins, "and hence all legal rules,
have a temporal dimension."' But the temporal dimension of human
affairs figures differently in different theories of property that might ex-
plain or justify legal rules. In this commentary, I want to examine how
the varying role of the temporal dimension in different underlying theo-
ries of property relates to some of the problems in the law of adverse
possession and restraints on alienation. I have selected these from the
wide variety of topics Epstein presents because I find them particularly
interesting for examining the relationship between legal doctrine and the
temporal dimension of theory.
There are three traditional strains in liberal property theory: the
Lockean labor-desert theory; the Benthamite utilitarian (and economic)
theory; and the Hegelian personality theory. In the Lockean theory, the
temporal or dynamic dimension of human affairs seems to be irrelevant,
but it plays an important role in the other two.
A. Lockean Entitlement
The reason that the temporal dimension is irrelevant to the Lockean
theory of property is that, at least in its classic form, it is only a theory of
just acquisition, concerning itself only with the moment in which entitle-
ments come into being. Entitlements come into being through mixing
one's labor with an unowned object, or, in Epstein's version, through
occupancy or first possession of an unowned object, and thereby are fixed
forever.2 Thus, one moment in time is relevant to entitlement, the mo-
* University of Southern California Law Center.
1. Epstein, Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the Law of Property, 65 WASH.
U.L.Q. 667, 667 (1986).
2. Locke did not concern himself with why an unowned object should not revert to the com-
mons when the owner dies, thence to be "occupied" again by a new owner, probably because he
assumed transmissibility of wealth by inheritance as a matter of natural law. Epstein, however, as a
modern theorist who rests some of his conclusions on the rule of first possession, should beware of
incautious statements such as "It would not do to allow a free-for-all once land passed out of the
hands of its rightful owner, for then the productive value of the land is diminished for all time."
Epstein, supra note 1, at 675. Clearly the land could instead revert to the common and thence be
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ment when non-property becomes property; but the temporal dimension
of human affairs, our situation in an ongoing stream of time, is irrelevant.
The term "just acquisition" belongs to the prominent neo-Lockean,
Robert Nozick, who theorizes that justice in holdings ideally consists of
whatever results from just acquisition and sequences of just transfers.'
This corresponds to saying that a holding is just if a valid chain of title
and a valid root of title (in original acquisition out of the common) can
both be shown. Here a temporal element enters in; the chain of title
extends in time from original acquisition to today. Thus, in neo-Lockean
theory, there is a temporal element connected with just transfer, but not
with initial entitlement itself.
In a non-ideal world, there are sometimes rip-offs and frauds instead of
just transfers. This makes necessary a third kind of theory in addition to
a theory of just acquisition and a theory of just transfer; namely, a cor-
rective justice theory, which Nozick calls a theory of rectification. Be-
cause Nozick is engaged mainly in ideal theory, he does not develop a
theory of rectification. Whether a neo-Lockean theory of corrective jus-
tice would contain temporal elements is therefore unclear, but it seems,
at least, that a Nozickian theory of corrective justice would not allow
time to diminish the force of old harms.4 In Neo-Lockean ideal liberta-
rian justice there seems to be no statute of repose. Once the chain is
tainted somewhere between original acquisition and today, corrective jus-
tice seems to require that titles be redistributed to undo the effect of the
oppression or fraud, no matter how long ago. To say less than this would
undermine the absolute nature of the Lockean rights of property acquisi-
tion and free contract.'
efficiently re-possessed into private ownership. From the passage in which this sentence appears, it is
clear that Epstein is talking about the need to substitute earliest probable possession for first posses-
sion when attempting to implement first-possession theory in a non-ideal world. That proposition
can stand without the incautious statement about diminution of productive value for all time. The
proposition is questionable only at a deeper level, when one starts to ask whether attempting to play
out these ideal theories in real life is really the best thing to do given the non-ideal nature of our
world. I view this question as a philosophical analogue to the problem of second-best. Epstein
implicitly admits its importance by resting many of his conclusions on allocation of risk of error in
light of imperfect information. See Radin, Risk-of-Error Rules and Non-Ideal Justification, in JUSTI-
FICATION: NoMos XXVIII (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1986).
3. R. NozICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974).
4. This appears to be Epstein's view also; see Epstein, supra note 1, at 667-68.
5. For those who consider the bitter historical details of conquests and other oppressions to be
the paramount non-ideal factor for ethics and politics, the requirements of such a timeless theory of
rectification would no doubt engulf most of Nozck's ideal libertarian non-redistributive conclusions.
[Vol. 64:739
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B. Utilitarianism
Utilitarian theory is more directly time-bound. In act-utilitarianism
the preferred or justified course of action is to maximize welfare (or util-
ity, or whatever is the maximand) right now. But human interactions
and our environment are dynamic, so as time moves on the preferred or
justified course of action changes. Furthermore, in determining the pre-
ferred course of action the future is what governs. To judge an act by its
consequences for utility is, from the standpoint of the time of making the
decision, to rest rightness on prediction.
In rule-utilitarianism, the preferred or justified course of action is to
maximize welfare (or whatever) in "the long run" in contradistinction to
right now. Hence, the dynamic nature of human affairs is more directly
implicated in the preferred course of action. One consequence of this is
that in rule-utilitarianism we are always cognizant of systemic concerns:
How will any given choice affect the entire system of entitlements and
expectations as it produces and maintains welfare over time? Thus, time
is embedded at the heart of rule-utilitarianism. Indeed, its temporal
heart harbors its deepest puzzles. How long is the long run? Does it
include future generations? If so, how do we attribute utility (or
whatever) to them, and how do we compare it with the utility of people
alive today? Is the utility of people who are not alive today but were
alive yesterday of any relevance? If so, at what point does the utility of
the dead cease to count? In order to maximize utility, should we (in light
of the principle of decreasing marginal utility) maximize population until
everyone is at a bare subsistence level? And so forth.
C. Property and Personhood
Time is also at the heart of the personality theory, but in a different
way. In the Hegelian theory, ownership is accomplished by placing one's
will into an object. A modern extrapolation of this idea suggests that the
claim to an owned object grows stronger as, over time, the holder be-
comes bound up with the object.6 Conversely, the claim to an object
grows weaker as the will (or personhood) is withdrawn. In other words,
in personality theory the strength of property claims is itself dynamic
because over time the bond between persons and objects can wax and
wane.
6. I have given my construal of Hegel's property theory, a contemporary reconstruction, and
some practical results for the law, in Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982).
Number 3]
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Because personality theory concerns individual rights and not general
welfare, it does not harbor the same temporal puzzles as rule-utilitarian-
ism. Since it places entitlement in the present state of the relationship
between person and object and not in some aboriginal appropriation, it
also avoids the major problem of the Lockean individual rights theory.
Personality theory must struggle instead with how to construe the notion
of personhood and the notion of relationships between persons and ob-
jects. In coherence and contextualist philosophical views, these central
notions themselves are developing through history; that is, they have a
temporal dimension.
II. ADVERSE POSSESSION
In this section I shall comment on two aspects of Epstein's treatment
of adverse possession, suggesting that his lack of clear focus on the vary-
ing role of the temporal element in the different theories of property re-
sults in some distortions. First, Epstein sees a tension between Lockean
entitlement theory, which he refers to as "principle," and what appears
to be a form of rule-utilitarianism, which he refers to as "pragmatic."7
With respect to this opposition of principle and pragmatics, I suggest
that Epstein himself is in tension with regard to the extent of his commit-
ment to Lockean entitlement or rule-utilitarianism as his primary norma-
tive theory. Second, Epstein ignores personality theory. This might
mean that he finds it wholly implausible as an explanatory/justificatory
theory, and if so I differ with him. I think it sheds interesting light on
some aspects of the problem of adverse possession. 8
7. Epstein, supra note 1, at 674-76.
8. In addition to the omission of this theoretical point of view, which is no doubt a matter of
normative choice on Epstein's party, there are substantive omissions from his treatment of adverse
possession that I believe should be included in any general discussion of the common-law treatment
of nonconsensual transfer of property rights over time. The most important omission is prescription,
by which an adverse user creates a divided title where formerly there was one owner. It is difficult to
use the standard rule-utilitarian treatment of adverse possession (i.e., that it clears titles and facili-
tates transactions) to justify prescription. The most one can say, perhaps, is that where a court has a
choice between awarding an easement by prescription or awarding the entire fee interest by adverse
possession, it ought to choose the latter. This could explain why those who build encroaching build-
ings are awarded a fee in the strip they have built upon, rather than an easement to maintain a
building upon that portion of their neighbor's land. See, &g., Belotti v. Bickhardt, 228 N.Y. 296, 127
N.E. 239 (1920).
Another important omission is the problem of nonconsensual transfer between a private party and
a governmental entity or the general public by means of adverse use. The problem goes both ways:
how should we treat adverse possession against a government title; and how should we treat adverse
[Vol. 64:739
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A. Entitlement and Utilitarianism: Principle versus Pragmatics?
First, let us consider the tension between Lockeanism and rule-utili-
tarianism with regard to adverse possession; that is, with regard to
awarding title to present possession of sufficient length rather than seek-
ing first possession. "As a matter of high principle," Epstein says, "what
comes first is best; as a matter of evidence and proof, however, what
comes last is more reliable and certain."9 But why is it important to be
reliable and certain, rather than simply pursuing what is best, letting the
chips fall where they may? If entitlement is a matter of natural right,
superior to all manipulations of the state in the interest of social welfare,
why isn't this a matter of Fiat justicia, ruat caelum? For Epstein, at least,
it is important to be reliable and certain because that will maximize the
general gain.10 This is implicitly a species of rule-utilitarianism known as
transactions-costs economics.
But now we are prompted to ask, if rule-utilitarianism governs entitle-
ments now, why doesn't it govern entitlements then? That is, why
doesn't Epstein simply argue that it is efficiency, suitably construed as
"long-run" or dynamic, that governs entitlements? If efficiency governs
entitlements, then there is no tension between "high principle" and the
merely "pragmatic," there is just the problem of what really is efficient,
given the dynamic nature of the system. Certainly the principle of first
possession could be reconstrued in rule-utilitarian terms: It makes utili-
tarian sense to get things out of the common and into the control of a
possession or user by the general public? See, eg., Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 2 Cal. 3d 29, 465 P.2d
50, 84 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1970); and CAL. CIV. CODE § 1009 (Deering Supp. 1986).
9. Epstein, supra note 1, at 674. Epstein's argument is that the longer the lapse of time be-
tween relevant events and a legal decision, the greater the costs to the system. Specifically, the
argument seems to run like this: (1) as time passes, it becomes more difficult to ascertain facts, and
thus uncertainty increases; (2) the greater the uncertainty the greater the risk of error in any specific
decision; (3) the greater the risk of error the higher the costs associated with any specific decision;
(4) therefore, the longer the time between relevant events and a legal decision, the higher the costs
associated with that decision; and (5) therefore, the longer the time between relevant events and all
legal decisions, the higher the costs associated with legal decisions in the aggregate. Perhaps per-
versely, I wonder whether the argument is as self-evident as Epstein seems to think. Might uncer-
tainty sometimes decrease as time passes? (It might if your normative theory of property tells you to
look to productive use, settled expectations, or the bonds of personhood rather than first possession.)
Might uncertainty ever decrease risk of error? (It might, if a right normative result does exist and we
are steadfastly pursuing the wrong one.)
10. Indeed, "[t]he real questions are not whether a statute of limitations in the round works
some Pareto superior move. Instead the harder question is one of fine tuning. What is the best way
to structure the rules of adverse possession in order to maximize the general gain?" Epstein, supra
note 1, at 680.
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single decision maker, and the principle of first possession is (the argu-
ment would run) cheaper to agree upon than others that might present
themselves. The problem for a utilitarian who is trying to be a libertarian
at the same time is rather that the thoroughgoing rule-utilitarian ap-
proach to entitlement seems not to be absolute; it seems, in fact, to re-
quire redistribution of entitlements under certain circumstances.'"
In other words, under thoroughgoing rule-utilitarianism, rearrange-
ment of entitlements over time through means other than transfer by
contract between individuals cannot be confined to adverse possession.
Whatever assumptions we choose about the long run and the role of the
utility of future generations, etc., it is hard to construct a utilitarian argu-
ment concluding that an entitlement gained through first possession is
fixed for all time. Utilitarianism is too empirical for such absolutes. For
utilitarianism, "pragmatics" is "high principle." All we have is some
giant balance weighing the welfare gain from certainty of planning and
transacting, and from not disturbing the "subjective" value of developed
expectations of continued control over resources,1 2 against the welfare
losses from holdouts against land reform, or implementation of new tech-
nology, or the demoralization of the have-nots vis-A-vis the haves, etc.
The advantage of Lockean (and Nozickian) natural rights theory is that
it seems proof against non-contractual redistribution. 13 The disadvan-
tage is that it cannot account for adverse possession, which it appears the
functioning legal system-the enforcer of those "absolute" entitle-
11. See, e.g., J. BUCHANAN, THE LIMrrs OF LIBERTY ch. 10 (1975) (arguing that constitutional
"renegotiation" would be chosen as preferable to a revolution otherwise predictable in light of ongo-
ing shifts in the underlying power balance among various groups).
12. Jeremy Bentham gives more recognition to this than does Epstein. See J. BENTHAM, THE
THEORY OF LEGISLATION, PRINCIPLES OF THE CIVIL CODE, Part I, ch. 10 (1789):
"Everything which I possess, or to which I have a title, I consider in my own mind as
destined always to belong to me. I make it the basis of my expectations, and of the hopes
of those dependent upon me; and I form my plan of life accordingly. Every part of my
property may have, in my estimation, besides its intrinsic value, a value of affection-as an
inheritance from my ancestors, as the reward of my own labour, or as the future depen-
dence of my children. Everything about it represents to my eye that part of myself which I
have put into it-those cares, that industry, that economy which denied itself present
pleasures to make provision for the future. Thus our property becomes a part of our being,
and cannot be torn from us without rending us to the quick."
Of course, this insight is also at the root of the personality theory of property. The personality
theory can be conflated with a welfare theory that pays sufficient attention to "subjective" value,
including attention to which subsets of property interests this kind of "subjective" value is likely to
attach. In my treatment of personality theory I do not do this because I do not treat this kind of
value as "subjective." See Radin, supra note 6.
13. Although I think this is not so once a theory of rectification is admitted as necessary; see
supra note 5.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol64/iss3/5
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ments-cannot do without.' 4  Hence Epstein's tension. Does he intend
to defend a pluralist meta-ethic? (Are absolute natural rights somehow
involved in a paradoxical coexistence with utility maximization as the
sole good?) Or does he intend to abandon natural rights theory and face
the difficulties of utilitarian ethics? Epstein has not yet squarely faced
this problem.
B. Property Theory and Adverse Possession
Now let me complicate the question by throwing another "ethic" into
the hopper. For personality theory, adverse possession is easy, at least if
one is envisioning possession by natural persons who successively occupy
land. The title follows the will, or investment of personhood. If the old
title-holder has withdrawn her will, and the new possessor has entered, a
new title follows. Title is temporal because the state of relations between
wills and objects changes.I5 The result of this theory is to attach norma-
tive force, and not merely practical significance, to the bond developing
between adverse possessor and object over time; and to attach normative
force, as well, to the "laches" of the title-holder who allows this to
happen.
To suggest how the problem of adverse possession might be further
illuminated through explicit attention to theories of property, I shall now
14. Epstein seems to feel that the legal system is now doing without adverse possession, more or
less, having developed better methods of dealing with the problem, but the 850 appellate opinions
since 1966 examined by Helmholz seems to make this an overstatement; see Helmholz, Adverse
Possession and Subjective Intent, 61 WASH. U.L.Q. 331 (1983). In any case, the better methods of
dealing with the problem are modem conveyancing and recording practices, and these are (arguably)
"better" only in a utilitarian, not a Lockean sense, because they make title-holders actively pursue
the goal of remaining title-holders. Further, I imagine that these better practices deal less well with
acquisition of less than a fee interest (i.e., prescription) than they do with acquisition of the fee by
adverse possession. Hence, I would hypothesize that the volume of prescription cases has not dimin-
ished as much as the volume of adverse possession cases, assuming their volume has in fact dimin-
ished. But this problem awaits investigation.
15. As Hegel puts this:
The form given to a possession and its mark are themselves externalities but for the subjec-
tive presence of the will which alone constitutes the meaning and value of externalities.
This presence, however, which is use, employment, or some other mode in which the will
expresses itself, is an event in time, and what is objective in time is the continuance of this
expression of the will. Without this the thing becomes a res nullius, because it has been
deprived of the actuality of the will and possession. Therefore I gain or lose possession of
property through prescription.
HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT § 64 (T. Knox trans. 1952).
In other words, for Hegel "actual" possession is needed to keep title as well as to gain it through
adverse possession.
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consider how the three "ethics" map onto the problem. In order to talk
about this, I would like to introduce two categories that I think are help-
ful in organizing discussion of adverse possession. One category involves
differentiating among three paradigm cases of adverse possession; the
other involves the shifting role in legal doctrine and practice of the ad-
verse possessor's state of mind.
The cases in which adverse possession comes up can usefully be di-
vided into three paradigms, which I call "color of title," "boundaries,"
and "squatters." These are subsets that might well refine Epstein's treat-
ment of the problem. While the lay person may picture adverse posses-
sion as applying to the situation where aggressive trespassers take over a
plot of ground and treat it as their own, and while some theoretical treat-
ments of adverse possession, pro and con, may seem to have this "squat-
ters" paradigm in mind, 6 most legal cases involve the other two
paradigms. In the "color of title" case, the possessor holds an invalid
document of title and eventually has to defend against the "true owner"
or someone claiming under her. This happens, for example, where a
grantor fraudulently grants the same parcel twice and the second grantee
takes possession. 7 In the "boundaries" case, the boundary line observed
by neighboring property owners in practice does not correspond with
what their documents say; eventually one of them litigates to correct the
discrepancy. '
Second, I think it is useful to take note of the disagreement, both in
legal doctrine and in practice, 19 regarding the role of the adverse posses-
sor's state of mind. There are three positions that have existed in legal
doctrine: (1) state of mind is irrelevant; (2) the required state of mind is,
"I thought I owned it;" (3) the required state of mind is, "I thought I did
not own it [and intended to take it]."20 These can roughly be thought of
16. For example, much of Epstein's utilitarian reasoning assumes a knowing adverse possessor
moving in on someone else's property. This assumption ignores the more common cases where
people are simply mistaken.
17. See, e.g., Lessee of Ewing v. Burnet, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 41 (1837).
18. See, e-g., Ennis v. Stanley, 346 Mich. 296, 78 N.W.2d 114 (1956). It is my tentative view,
which it would take a Helmholzian endeavor to substantiate (see Helmholz, supra note 14), that
permeation of reasoning appropriate to the "squatters" picture may have caused conflict and confu-
sion in the law surrounding the kinds of cases that actually occur.
19. As Helmholz has shown, supra note 14, it appears that the practice of judges is to take into
account state of mind more often than the doctrine in their jurisdictions would warrant.
20. This debate is usually put into the "hostile and under claim of right" part of the hornbook
doctrine. If we are to understand "claim of right" in any ordinary language sense, then we tend
toward position (2) (the "good-faith" standard), and must interpret "hostile" as meaning merely
[Vol. 64:739
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as the objective standard, the good-faith standard, and the aggressive
trespass standard.
1. Utilitarianism
The utilitarian argument is often stated as requiring simply that titles
must be cleared to facilitate transactions now (i.e., for the immediate fu-
ture). In this form, at least, the utilitarian argument seems to favor the
objective standard making state of mind evidence irrelevant. State of
mind evidence is one more cost of litigation, and presumably will result
in fewer titles being cleared.
Utilitarianism can countenance all three paradigms, and does not priv-
ilege the "color of title" case over the case of the aggressive, productive
trespasser.21 But the "boundary" case seems unclear. Once the discrep-
ancy between the record books and the lived boundaries is discovered,
does it maximize the gain for the system as a whole to change the records
to reflect the lived boundaries or to change the lived boundaries to corre-
spond with the records?22
The utilitarian argument, at least in its simple form, strongly favors
"tacking." On the side of the possessor, it creates a new chain of title in
non-permissive on the part of the "true owner." On the other hand, if we are to understand "hos-
tile" in an ordinary language sense, then we tend toward position (3) (the "aggressive trespasser"
standard), and must interpret "claim of right" to mean not claim of ownership, but merely non-
subservience to the claim of the title-holder. If we take position (1) (which I call the objective
standard), then "hostile and under claim of right" must be taken just to negate permission.
21. Epstein argues that the subset of "bad-faith" adverse possessors, which would presumably
include "squatters" and aggressive encroachers in boundary disputes, should be subject to a longer
statute of limitations before acquiring title. The asserted utilitarian ground for this argument is that
"parties who engage in deliberate wrongs constitute a greater threat than those who make innocent
errors or are simply negligent: there is a greater danger that intentional wrongdoers will do it all
again." Epstein, supra note I, at 686. But if the "wrongdoers" are productive and the title-holders
are passive, are the "wrong-doers" so wrong in the utilitarian sense? And to carve out a subset of
"bad-faith" cases makes evidence of "bad faith" relevant in every case. This is a cost to the system
and will fail to clear some titles where an accusation of "bad faith" is wrongly made to stick. (I
don't mean to suggest that making it harder to acquire property by adverse possession in "bad faith"
is necessarily wrong, only that it is probably more readily supported by nonutilitarian than by utilita-
rian normative arguments.)
22. If we heavily weight the utilitarian concern with notice (ability to structure other transac-
tions based upon foreseeable consequences), it is clear that the double message imparted when the
lived boundaries differ from the record books is costly, but unclear which way the correction should
go in order to eliminate the double message at least cost. If we heavily weight the utilitarian concern
for choosing rules so as to steer behavior into paths creating fewer transactions costs, then perhaps
we would think that the recorded boundaries should prevail: make people pay the price of failing to
check official boundaries, because then they will more often check them before acting and conform
their activities to them.
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the adverse possessor. To allow "tacking" on the other side presumably
reflects that anyone who buys from a titleholder out of possession is the
best cost avoider of losses due to adverse possession. The utilitarian ar-
gument also favors clearing title as against future interest holders at the
same time the adverse possessor acquires the present estate.23 In addi-
tion, it favors an objective interpretation of the notice requirement
("open and notorious") that does not depend upon whether the title-
holder knew of the adverse possession or even reasonably could have
known.24 "Disabilities" on the side of the old titleholder are difficult for
utilitarianism, for the losses to titleholders who are children, insane,
etc.,25 and unable to bring suit must be weighed against the costs to the
system of having a possible "disability" lurking behind every case where
there may be unknown persons on the side of the old titleholder, which
greatly prolongs clouds on the title.
2. Personhood
If one assumes, contrary to Hegel, that placing one's will into an ob-
ject, in the sense of having it become bound up with personhood, is a
process that does not take place overnight, then the personality theory is
as follows: the possessor's interest, initially fungible, becomes more and
more personal26 as time passes. At the same time, the titleholder's inter-
23. Epstein discusses this problem in detail supra note 1, at 689-91, concluding on utilitarian
grounds that there should be a longer statute of limitations for remaindermen than for holders of
present possessory estates. Without going into detail here, I believe there is an equally persuasive
utilitarian argument for cutting off remaindermen at the same time as the life estate holder (provided
that future interest holders have a cause of action against trespassers, by analogy with the law of
waste). Nevertheless, the two-tier result here is not as problematic from a utilitarian point of view as
is the two-tier result on the issue of "bad faith," because whether or not there is a remainderman
somewhere in the wings will not thereby become a submerged issue in every case.
24. For example, in Belotti v. Bickhardt, 228 N.Y. 296, 127 N.E. 239 (1920) it was sufficient to
establish "open and notorious" adverse possession that the title holder had seen the physical object
(an encroaching building), even though no one knew that the building was over the boundary line
because all parties relied on a mistaken map.
25. The common law tradition here is to grant extensions of the statute of limitations to those
who are minors, insane, prisoners, or out of the jurisdiction, but only if this "disability" existed on
the day the trespasser moved in. Epstein's re-construal of these common law traditions in utilitarian
terms leaves out prisoners' rights, and lacks an explanation of why the "disability" does not provide
any extra time to sue if it occurs after the trespasser has moved in, but before the statute has run.
26. I introduced the distinction between fungible and personal property in Radin, supra note 6.
If an object is fungible it is perfectly replaceable with money or other objects of its kind. If it is
personal, it has become bound up with the personhood of the holder and is no longer commensurate
with money. The distinction-which of course really marks the end points of a continuum of kinds
of relationships between persons and objects-may be symbolized as widgets versus wedding rings.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol64/iss3/5
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est fades from personal to fungible and finally to nothingness. At what
point is the titleholder detached enough and the adverse possessor at-
tached enough to make the switch? This is not a statute of limitations,
but a moral judgment. Should this judgment be made case-by-case or
approximated by a blanket rule? A blanket rule (such as a number)
would be chosen if that choice entailed less risk of moral error against
embodied personhood than other choices. If a number is chosen, that
number would be based upon the socially acceptable or "right" time it
takes to become attached/detached.27
Personality theory might seem to favor an explicit "good-faith" stan-
dard on the issue of the adverse possessor's state of mind, because it is
unclear how one's personhood can become bound up with ownership of
something unless she thinks she owns it. This may be its salient applica-
ble intuition to modem law. If one of the things adverse possession does
is protect developed expectations, in the sense of bonds between persons
and things, it is hard to see how these bonds can be as strong in the case
of people who know the object is not theirs. On the other hand, it seems
Hegel contemplated that binding yourself to an object you know is not
yours in fact will ultimately make it yours. Still, it seems personality
theory is more comfortable with the "color of title" case than with
"squatters." In the "boundary" case, it would recommend, more clearly
than would utilitarianism, that the boundaries as they are lived should
after awhile supersede the boundaries on paper.
The personality theory would seem to disfavor tacking on the side of
the adverse possessor. If the statute of limitations represents the time it
takes for the adverse possessor to become sufficiently bound up with the
property, then it appears that adverse possession has to be accomplished
by one person. On the other hand, personality theory does not seem to
yield an objection to tacking on the side of the old titleholder, since each
owner voluntarily severs the bonds.
Personality theory does not have anything to say about adverse posses-
sion by corporations. Nor does it address the problem of future interest
holders, since they have not yet had a chance to become self-invested in
the property. But since we need either voluntary transfers or true
"laches" in order to remove the bonds on the side of the old titleholder, I
imagine the issue of "disabilities" looms larger than it does in a utilita-
27. Might the long time required in common law England and in the colonies, and the shorter
time required in the American West, be related to cultural differences in the time required to become
attached to one's land?
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rian view. (But there are many problems here: Has an insane person
removed herself from involvement with her property?)
3. Lockean Entitlement
As already discussed, the pure Lockean theory does not countenance
adverse possession. But perhaps it colors the theory of adverse posses-
sion anyway by lending some sympathy to "squatters." After all, if prop-
erty is acquired from the common by a nonowner simply by taking it and
using it, can we not sympathize with someone who does likewise with
owned but unused property, especially if she does not know it is owned?
III. RESTRAINTS UPON ALIENATION
The topic of inalienability and restraints upon alienation is a much
broader one than the topic of adverse possession, but so far has been
insufficiently studied.2" The legal infrastructure of capitalism, that is,
what is necessary in order for a laissez-faire market system to operate,
comprises not merely private property, but private-property-plus-free-
contract. That is, in order for the exchange system to operate to allocate
resources, there must be both private entitlement to resources and per-
mission to transfer entitlements at will to other private owners. One of
the ways liberal theory has sometimes reflected this necessity is by claim-
ing that free alienability is inherent in the concept of property.2 9 (Liberal
theory could equally well claim, of course, and sometimes does, that pri-
vate entitlement is implicit in the concept of freedom of contract.) The
result has been that the ideal picture of property is perfect alienability,
perfect fungibility.
Because of its centrality to the market society infrastructure, alienabil-
ity is one of the most important liberal indicia of property. The whole
28. Epstein and I are both seeking to remedy that situation. In Epstein's view, "the only justifi-
cation for restraints of private alienation is to prevent the infliction of external harms, either through
aggression or the depletion of common-pool resources." Epstein supra note 1, at 705; see also Ep-
stein, Why Restrain Alienation? 85 COLUM. L. REV. 970 (1985). In my view, the explana-
tion/justification of inalienabilities and restraints on alienation depends upon their coherence with
developing central values of personhood and community. See Radin, Market-Inalienability (forth-
coming in 100 HARV. L. REV. (1987)).
29. It seems to me that one of the ways the common law reflected this conceptual tendency was
in striking down restraints because they were "repugnant to a fee." In other words, free alienability
was inherent in the concept of being a fee simple absolute, and a fee simple with strings attached was
something of a contradiction in terms. (Of course, for a utilitarian this conceptualism seems to make
a fee some kind of metaphysical entity, when it is really only whatever turns out to be the most
socially useful package of rights.)
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maze of fees tail, defeasible fees, and future interests, as well as the com-
mon law marital property scheme, can be seen as restraints upon aliena-
tion in the sense of deviating from the idealized model of the unrestricted
fee simple absolute, as can the various servitude doctrines. The holder of
a fee tail could never alienate a fee simple. The holder of a defeasible fee
cannot transfer it free of the defeasing conditions, just as the modem
freeholder cannot transfer free of running covenants and servitudes.
Hence the land is in practice inalienable (non-transferrable) to those who
would violate the conditions.
The common law developed various doctrines limiting restraints upon
alienation imposed by grantors3 0 Fees tail became relatively easy to
evade, and now are disallowed by various statutes that reconstrue an at-
tempted fee tail as another (more alienable) interest. Permissible servi-
tudes were (and are) limited by the requirement that they "touch and
concern" land, among others. Although the common law did not de-
velop workable limits on future interests remaining in the grantor (pos-
sibilities of reverter and rights of entry), there is a trend in modem law to
limit them, primarily by Marketable Title Acts.
A. Free Contract and Utilitarianism: Another Case of
Principle versus Pragmatics?
Epstein is puzzled by the limits on restraints upon alienation in the
common law. In turn, I am puzzled by his puzzlement.3 1  He seems to
think that utilitarian (and Lockean?) reasoning would lead to total free-
dom in grantors to create whatever restraints they wish. 32 There is the
30. Epstein's focus upon the rule against perpetuities, which limits only certain kinds of future
interests in persons other than the grantor (contingent remainders and executory interests), obscures
both the scope of the problem of restraints upon alienation and the range of the common law's
responses to it.
31. At least in the case of remainders, Epstein does argue that the restraint is inefficient; he
professes puzzlement about why a grantor would want to create them. Epstein, supra note 1, at 706-
07.
32. Note that Epstein holds at the same time that legally imposed restraints are forbidden, with
the exception of necessary prevention of external harm. See id. at 705, quoted at supra, note 28.
Thus his position is that government-imposed structuring of transactions between persons is forbid-
den, unless necessary to prevent externalities, while private (government-authorized) transactions
between persons must be protected against government restructuring, even if they create restraints
resulting in costly externalities. This position may ultimately be incoherent: For a utilitarian, an
externality is an externality. At minimum, it places great weight on the problematic "pub-
lic/private" distinction. From a libertarian point of view, there is no reason to suppose that publicly
imposed restraints always represent rent-seeking by special interest groups; sometimes, especially in
small local jurisdictions, they may really reflect uncoerced community consensus. There is likewise
Number 3]
Washington University Open Scholarship
752 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
same puzzle in the common law limitations on servitudes. Epstein seems
to think there is no utilitarian or Lockean reason for limiting the kinds
and durations of servitudes that landowners can create. In other words,
whatever restrictions the grantor-developer inserts in the deed and man-
ages to sell would be at the same time efficient, an expression of total
dominion or liberty with respect to property, and an expression of abso-
lute freedom of contract. I shall argue, however, that rather than finding
this harmony, Epstein should find here the same tension between abso-
lute rights and rule-utilitarianism that he finds in the law of adverse
possession.
The common law limits on restraints on alienation suggest that there
may have to be some limits on market transactions now in order to en-
sure that there will still be a market in the future. This would be per-
fectly rationalizable in utilitarian terms, as would the common-law rule
that "A man cannot create a new kind of inheritance."33 Assuming that
it is efficient to maintain a market with a large scope forever (the long
run), then it is efficient to impose enough restraints now to prevent grant-
ors from tying up resources for the future in ways that seriously reduce
the scope of the free market. And it seems prima facie cost-effective to
disallow endless proliferation of different "bundles of sticks" which
would cause a great amount of uncertainty and transactions costs;
although, of course, the grantors' welfare in imposing their whims would
have to be weighed against this, and whims are hard to weigh.
Epstein is not unaware of the problem of the future market versus the
present liberty of contract, of course, but I suggest that it needs deeper
treatment than he has so far accorded it." In his paper, it is dismissed in
one rather opaque paragraph. The paragraph reads as follows:
The attack against absolute ownership is not only based upon a concern
for dynamics of wealth disposition within the family. In part, the criticism
derives from an extensive social concern with intergenerational fairness,
no reason to suppose that privately imposed restraints always represent uncoerced consensus; some-
times, especially if widely imposed and uniform, they may reflect rent-seeking by those with market
power.
33. Johnson v. Whiton, 159 Mass. 424, 34 N.E. 542 (1893) (citing Co. Litt. 27).
34. Frank Michelman has demonstrated theoretically that completely free alienation cannot co-
exist with complete "propertization" (division of the world of scarce resources into efficient packages
of entitlements); see ETHICS, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW: NoMos XXIV (J. Pennock & J. Chapman
eds. 1982). Gregory Alexander has examined in detail how this tension was played out in nine-
teenth-century property law; see The Dead Hand and the Law of Trusts in the Nineteenth Century,
37 STAN. L. REV. 1189 (1985).
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where it has two dimensions. The first arises from the fact that no future
person can own property today. The second derives from a concern with
income redistribution, which taken in its extreme form holds that initial
financial endowments of any individual should not depend upon the wealth
of his parents. Often these concerns are offered as reasons to limit the
rights of present owners to dispose of property as they will. But the con-
cern is misplaced. Even if members of the present generation have absolute
control over their own material wealth, they cannot deny to members of the
next generation their right to their own labor-rights that will be worth
more to them in an open and prosperous society. Efforts at confiscation are
likely to produce defensive measures that will dissipate the overall stock of
wealth, and short of a violent disruption of the family, they cannot reach
the wide range of implicit and explicit transfers that take place when chil-
dren live in the family household. Far from taking coercive steps to pro-
mote a set of equal economic endowments for the unborn, the better
strategy is to develop institutional arrangements that insure that all mem-
bers of the next generation will be able to develop their own talents without
having to pay (say, in the form of higher taxes) for the extravagances of the
previous one, and without being subject to various restrictions (e.g., the
minimum wage) that work to entrench the established interests [footnotes
omitted].
I shall do no more than sketch several reasons why this is unsatisfac-
tory. First, if the market is absolutely or conceptually necessary for lib-
erty, and liberty is an absolute right, the idea of intergenerational
fairness, if it conjures up some balancing between present and future sat-
isfactions, does not adequately capture the absolute necessity, inherent in
the notion of liberty, that the market remains available.3 6 Second, I do
not think the future market in labor alone satisfies this intrinsic necessity
of liberal theory, to keep the market available for the future. At mini-
mum, it is clearly not the case, as Epstein suggests, that preserving only
the right to sell one's labor would allow for more valuable opportunities
(over the alternative of permitting government limits on grantors' free-
35. Epstein, supra note I, at 698-99.
36. For an argument that liberty should not be equated with market liberty, see Baker, Property
and Its Relation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 741 (1986). Cf J.S. MILL,
ON LIBERTY, ch. 5 (1849) stating: "the principle of individual liberty is not involved in the doctrine
of Free Trade." This argument may have been problematic for Mill, since he elsewhere seemed to
argue that liberty requires total dominion over property, including its alienation; see J.S. MILL,
PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, Book II, ch. ii (1848). It is less problematic for me, since I
am inclined to reject the purely "negative" view of liberty in favor of some more "positive" view.
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dom to restrain alienation of land for the future) for exploitation of one's
talents.
To take an extreme hypothetical, suppose that all land and other natu-
ral resources used as capital are entailed or otherwise nontransferable.
The situation would frustrate laborers because, no matter how "valua-
ble" their labor, they could not acquire these kinds of capital in order to
maximize their wealth. Capitalists also would be frustrated because, no
matter how "valuable" their capital, they could not invade it to acquire
the labor necessary to maximize their wealth. Under these circum-
stances, it hardly makes sense to say that labor has "value," much less
that its "value" is maximized. Unless the worker is creating things for
her own consumption, her labor (under a capitalist system, at any rate)
has no value in the absence of a buyer. Similarly, unless many classes of
widgets (other productive goods and inventions) could be produced with-
out using these tied-up and unreplenishable resources, the market could
not exist.
37
Thus, to "develop institutional arrangements that insure that all mem-
bers of the next generation will be able to develop their own talents"
involves imposing the type of institutional restraints on grantors' free-
dom that will insure both that the members of the next generation can
sell their labor to capitalists who are free to trade for it and that they can
acquire capital of their own. Finally, of course, this concern is by no
means a concern about "equal economic endowments for the unborn."
It is rather a concern about the meaning of the absolute value of liberty
and how it should be thought of in respect of the unborn, and a concern
about what is required to maximize wealth over time.
Even if the conceptual position that free alienability is inherent in the
concept of property accurately characterizes the common law, Epstein
misunderstands it. I view the common-law position on the free alienabil-
ity of property as a position in aid of there being free markets in whatever
resources are deemed capable of being property. To argue further in a
conceptual vein, as Epstein seems to,38 that the power to make something
inalienable for the future is logically included in the property owner's full
alienability at present, does not further free markets as time goes on.
Hence it would seem to be in contradiction to the ideal of alienability
37. An insight about this difference between absolute property in widgets and in land seems to
be the reason why 19th century theorists like J.S. Mill and T.H. Green argued for limitations on
property in land but not widgets.
38. Epstein supra note 1, at 704-05.
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that Epstein tries to derive it from, once the ideal of alienability is seen in
a dynamic dimension. This is true both from a utilitarian and a liberta-
rian point of view. For the utilitarian, open markets for the future are
necessary for the long-run maximization of welfare. For the libertarian,
market liberty now cannot be construed so as to foreclose significant
market liberty for those who will come later. Freedom of contract con-
tains the same temporal tension as does entitlement.
B. Temporality and the Servitude Problem
I would like to consider this temporal tension in slightly more detail
with respect to easements, covenants and servitudes, which I refer to ge-
nerically as servitudes.39 Although Epstein's view seems to be that a
grantor-developer can create whatever servitudes she desires, and, if the
lots are sold, make them "run" forever unless all parties subject to them
can get together to strike a new bargain, I think both the libertarian and
the economic or rule-utilitarian view of servitudes must be much more
complicated. In view of the need for alienability in a dynamic sense if
there is to be a free market in the long run, I believe more needs to be
said than that we should not permit any restraints upon present owners
to burden land for the future, because to do so "denies the original par-
ties their contractual freedom by subordinating their desires to the inter-
ests of future third parties, who by definition have no proprietary claim
to the subject property."'  Otherwise Epstein's theory of how to deal
with the temporal dimension of human affairs when considering liberty
(of all "future third parties") boils down to a version of Aprds moi, la
diluge.
A rule-utilitarian theory of servitudes is likewise a complex problem,
especially in light of the fact that whole tracts are covered by packages of
servitudes ("residential private governments"). First, as commentators
often note,41 it is hard to end servitudes by bargaining because of familiar
39. Unfortunately, Epstein does not go deeply into this topic in the present paper, although he
does affirm his earlier published views. Epstein supra note 1, at 713-14; see also Epstein, Notice and
Freedom of Contract in the Law of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1353 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
Notice and Freedom]. I view this as unfortunate because the servitude problem is the most interest-
ing current topic involving the effects of time on property rights; and because I think that if Epstein
had juxtaposed the servitude problem with his view of adverse possession he would not have failed to
see the same tension at work between absolute rights, which he calls "'principle," and utility, which
he calls "pragmatics."
40. Epstein, Notice and Freedom, supra note 39, at 1360.
41. See, e.g., Reichman, Judicial Supervision of Servitudes, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 139 (1978); Sterk,
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transactions-costs problems and strategic behavior (holding out against
those who attempt to negotiate; freeriding on those who litigate). The
common law "changed conditions" doctrine is a kind of "sunset" doc-
trine which can be construed as recognizing this. Marketable Title Acts,
to the extent they apply to servitudes, are even more clearly "sunset
laws." Does Epstein oppose Marketable Title Acts? Does he favor them
only as a default provision that grantor-developers can disclaim? If so,
how will he square this with the imperative he finds in adverse posses-
sion, that property as it is treated in real life must periodically be brought
into conformity with the record books?
Second, it is not clear that the nature of the land market and the resi-
dential housing market is such (or everywhere such) that developers will
be forced by competition to create optimal servitude packages. To the
extent that market failure is present, optimal results will not be achieved
through laissez-faire. If liberty or Lockean dominion nevertheless re-
quires total freedom of servitude creation, with respect to duration as
well as form, then Epstein will have to face a trade-off of efficiency for
liberty.
Third, in order to decide whether a package of servitudes is welfare-
maximizing, we must consider whether we are trying to maximize only
the welfare of those in the tract covered by the servitudes, or the welfare
of the suburb in which the tract is located, or the welfare of the whole
city or region, etc. In other words, in order to know whether a servitude
package is optimal, one of the things we have to know is whether it cre-
ates significant externalities, and in order to know what are to count as
externalities, we have to know the "jurisdiction" over which we are max-
imizing welfare. If we are maximizing welfare merely within the tract
itself, we do not mind that its requirement that all houses be painted sky-
blue-pink casts significant costs onto neighboring tracts, whereas if our
welfare "jurisdiction" is the entire suburb, sky-blue-pink becomes a cost
that must be taken into account.42 To make matters worse, the optimal
jurisdiction is likely to vary over time, and there is no reason to suppose
that it will be coextensive with political boundaries, still less with the
Freedom from Freedom of Contract: The Enduring Value of Servitude Restrictions, 70 IOWA L. REV.
615 (1985).
42. In my view, this "optimal jurisdiction problem" is an interesting way to see the issue the
court was wrestling with in Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336
A.2d 713, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975) ("[Ihe general welfare which developing municipalities
like Mount Laurel must consider extends beyond their boundaries and cannot be parochially con-
fined to the claimed good of the particular municipality.").
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extent of land owned by any given grantor-developer imposing servi-
tudes. To my knowledge, commentators on the servitude problem, while
often pointing to the externality-creating potential, have ignored this
problem.
Time creates complexities in the servitude problem from the point of
view of personality theory also. I shall conclude by taking note of some
of them. A community that, either by local zoning legislation or by "res-
idential private government," excludes certain kinds of people, for exam-
ple by age, gender, class, or race, or even certain kinds of architecture, is
creating a social environment for itself. The community might be desira-
ble to purchasers for the very reason that it is "exclusionary" in this
sense. These physical and social characteristics of a community can be-
come bound up over time with the personhood of individual residents
and with the group's existence as a community. In other words, these
restrictions create long-term status relationships that resist alteration by
contract. Since this is so, it is misleading to think of servitudes as only
contractual, even though they begin by original buyers voluntarily (or
nominally voluntarily) signing on to them.
In my present thinking on this subject, one cannot judge in the ab-
stract whether this kind of status creation is good or bad. It might be
bad if those in the main stream of American culture and economic life,
who are not having difficulty living out their culture and beliefs, create
monolithic exclusions that make it impossible for minorities and dissent-
ers to form communities and live out their alternative visions. It might
be good if it instead enables minorities and dissenters to form communi-
ties and live out their alternative visions. Be that as it may, unless we are
sure that wealth distribution is such, and the housing market is such, that
those who live under servitudes can freely go elsewhere if they find them
onerous, it does not sit well in liberal ideology for someone to be stuck
with a status forever, even if she has "chosen" it originally, and still less
does it sit well with liberal ideology for successors in title to be stuck with
it forever.43 The progress from status to contract, from feudalism to the
free market, is viewed as progress in freedom to make of oneself what one
will, with flexibility to develop and change in the course of one's lifetime.
This whole debate is often couched in terms of trying to breathe life
into the common law touch-and-concern requirement.' It might be bet-
43. Cf. the treatment of "regret" as a moral reason to limit freedom of contract in Kronman,
Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763 (1983).
44. See, e.g., Reichman, Judicial Supervision of Servitudes, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 139 (1978).
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ter for us just to say there are moral limitations on servitudes. Allowing
people to get stuck in statuses that are anti-personhood is contrary to the
liberal ideal of self-development, while allowing them to create enduring
statuses that are pro-personhood is an expression of the liberal ideal. For
personality theory, the degree of attachment to the servitude would be
relevant, as well as whether it creates a status that persons should become
attached to in expressing personhood or freedom.45 What counts as a
pro-personhood status is in my view also contextual; that is, it evolves
through time.
IV. CONCLUSION
The problem of maintaining freedom over time and throughout a legal
and political system is not the same problem theoretically as exercising
freedom at the moment.46 This is the central theoretical issue I believe
Epstein has not come to grips with in his general treatment of restraints
upon alienation. He has focused on the freedom of individual grantors
and creators of servitudes, without taking fully into account what role
the resulting restraints play in enhancing or inhibiting freedom or per-
sonhood systematically and over time. The tension engendered by this
issue is analogous to the tension in normative theories of property that
Epstein has noticed, but not worked through, in his treatment of adverse
possession.
45. Perhaps the list of proscribed servitudes would include things that look like new feudalism,
such as requirements that the resident always buy supplies at the grantor's store, serve in the gran-
tor's employ, etc.; and things that look like discrimination by the relatively powerful against the
relatively powerless, such as the formerly common servitudes specifying that the resident must be of
the Caucasian race; and perhaps things that look like tying essentials of life (like housing) to impor-
tant and disputed matters of conscience, like religion or political affiliation, etc. This list of moral
limitations on servitudes correlates fairly well with Reichman's proposed rereading of the touch-and-
concern requirements. See Reichman, supra note 44.
46. Perhaps this is why J.S. Mill in ON LIBERTY argued against freedom to sell oneself into
slavery on the ground that "[t]he principle of freedom cannot require that [one] should be free not to
be free. It is not freedom to be allowed to alienate [one's] freedom." J.S. MILL, supra note 36.
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